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Abstract—Electronic devices we use on a daily basis collect
sensitive information without preserving user’s privacy. In this
paper, we propose the lord of the sense (LotS), a privacy pre-
serving reputation system for participatory sensing applications.
Our system maintains the privacy and anonymity of information
with the use of cryptographic techniques and combines voting
approaches to support users’ reputation. Furthermore, LotS
maintains accountability by tracing back a misbehaving user while
maintaining k-anonymity. A detailed security analysis is presented
with the current advantages and disadvantages of our system.
Index Terms—Participatory Sensing, Distributed Sensing, Ur-
ban Sensing, Privacy, Anonymity, Security, Reputation Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years we have seen a dramatic growth in
the use of mobile Internet, including the massive demands for
mobile data, the growth of mobile video, and the rise of the
smartphones and tablets as a new gateway to the web itself.
According to Cisco [1], in 2011 mobile data traffic was
8 times the size of the entire global Internet in 2000 (597
petabytes vs. 75 petabytes). It is also estimated that the number
of mobile-connected devices will exceed the number of people
on earth by the end of 2012. By 2016, there will be 1.4 mobile
devices per capita and there will be over 10 billion mobile-
connected devices, including machine-to-machine (M2M) mod-
ules. Again, the number will exceed the world’s population at
that time (7.3 billion).
The adoption of mobile devices in combination with the
evolution of Web 2.0 has emerged to a new research era that is
often referred to as participatory sensing. Participatory sensing
targets the pervasive collection of information from the actual
environment of the user [2].
However, the involvement of people in the process opens
up new challenges; mobile devices gather and collate sensorial
data from the user’s immediate environment that derives to
privacy concerns. In addition, technology copies and collects
private data without users approval, such as tracking their
location or harvesting their address book. Recent studies have
shown that privacy issues discourages the user’s involvement
in participatory sensing and, thus, it has a great impact on the
acceptability and adoption of these new technologies [2].
A. Our Contribution
This paper presents Lord of the Sense (LotS), a privacy-
preserving reputation system for participatory sensing appli-
cations. In particular, users in LotS manage to keep their
real identity hidden, while at the same time they have a
reputation score for which they cannot lie about or shed.
The reputation of each user is updated and demonstrated in
a way that does not compromise user anonymity. By using
appropriate cryptographic mechanisms, unlinkability between
the real identity of a user and the reports that she publishes is
achieved. In addition, each user can vote for every published
report while at the same time double voting is prevented.
B. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the most important studies that deal with
privacy issues in the field of participatory sensing, as well as
protocols that will help us design a mechanism to protect the
privacy of users in such applications. In Section III, we describe
our problem statement and the basic terms we use in the rest of
the paper. In Section IV, we present our main protocol, while
in Section V we provide a security discussion in which we
show the resistance of our protocol against numerous attacks.
Finally, in Section VI we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Although there are many participatory sensing applications
[3]–[13], only some of them deal with the problem of anony-
mous and private data reporting. Furthermore, the absence of
reputation schemes that would create a rank for each user, based
on their reports and the votes that each report receives from the
community is even bigger.
AnonySense [14] allows a variety of applications to request
sensor data using a flexible tasking language and later to receive
by the system the sensor data from personal mobile devices.
Data is collected in an opportunistic and delay-tolerant manner,
in which a large and dynamic set of mobile nodes can volunteer
to accept tasks and send back reports, both reliably and anony-
mously. Anonysense is based on a Mix Network [15] in order
to guarantee user unlinkability between reports with respect
to WiFi access points. While there exists extensive research
on privacy, anonymity and unlinkability in WiFi networks,
such an assumption imposes severe limitations on the scope
of participatory sensing applications, as an ubiquitous presence
of openWiFi networks is neither realistic today nor anticipated
in the near future. Therefore, such an assumption would heavily
limit the applications’ availability and accuracy.
E. De Cristofaro and C. Soriente introduced PEPSI [16],
a privacy-enhanced participatory sensing protocol with main
aim to hide reports and queries to unintended parties. Their
protocol is based on Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [17]
which enables non interactivity, a major concern in participa-
tory sensing scenarios, where mobile nodes and queriers have
no direct communication or mutual knowledge. Even though
PEPSI is considered as a lightweight protocol, which makes
it suitable for devices with limited resources, it has two main
disadvantages. First, the security of the protocol relies on the
assumption that the service provider is not colluding with either
the registration authority or the queriers. Second, PEPSI needs
to trust the network operator to remove sensitive data from
reports before forwarding them to the service provider.
In [18] authors presents a location based privacy system
(LOCATE) for participatory sensing applications that targets
Android devices. LOCATE allows users to locally sense
and store data as well as issue queries on data stored across
the system. The main differences between LOCALE and its
predecessors is mainly found in the fact that LOCALE′s
user data is generated and stored locally on the individual
user’s device while in the existing approaches, data sharing
operate under the assumption that user data is maintained in a
centralized database.
To the best of our knowledge, IncogniSense [19] is the only
privacy preserving reputation system designed for participatory
sensing applications. It is an anonymity-preserving reputation
framework based on blind signatures, which is agnostic to
both the reputation algorithm and applications. IncogniSense
preserves the anonymity of the users by using pseudonym
systems. Nevertheless, IncogniSense has two main drawbacks.
The first drawback is the absence of a voting procedure; a
feature that makes the problem of building a privacy-preserving
reputation system for participatory sensing applications more
difficult and the protocol more concrete. The second drawback
is related to the fact that IncogniSense does not provide any
mechanism for accountability. More precise, when a user acts
maliciously there is no way that her real identity will be
revealed in order to encounter the repercussions that are defined
from the community regarding misbehaving users.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT & DEFINITIONS
Our protocol consists of clients, a registration authority (RA)
and an application server which is referred as the community
(C). Clients collect data from their mobile devices and submit
them anonymously to the application server.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the concept of
public key cryptography. For the needs of our protocol, each
authority has generated a public/private key pair. The private
key is kept secret, while the public key is shared with the rest
of the community. These keys will be used to secure message
exchanges in the community.It is also assumed that users knows
the public keys of RA and C. Furthermore, our protocol also
relies on the use of group signatures [20] for the verification
of a user without revealing her real identity.
Registration Authority (RA): RA is responsible for the
registration of users. Additionally, RA has a public/private
key pair denoted as pkRA/skRA. Apart from that, RA is
responsible for generating parameters that will be used for the
proper function of our protocol (submit a new report, vote for
a report, update reputation scores).
Community (C): C is responsible for handling the main
tasks of our protocol. More precisely, C allows a user to publish
a report, to vote for an already published report and to update
the reputation score of registered users. Additionally, C has a
public/private key pair denoted as pkC/skC .
Group Signatures: Groups signatures as described in [20]
is a group of users that can create a signature group with the
following properties:
• Only members of that group can sign message on behalf
of the group
• The receiver can verify that signed message is a valid
signature from that group
• The resulting signature does not reveal signer’s identity
• If a user acts maliciously, the signature can be opened and
reveal the real identity of the user
In this paper, we focus on the following problem:
Problem Statement: Let U = {u1, . . . , un} be the set of all
users that are registered through a registration authority RA
and C the community that handles all the reports. In addition
to that, a reputation score rui must be associated with each
user. Lets suppose that a user ui wishes to publish a report
Ruij to the community. First, ui must convince C that she is a
registered user without revealing her real identity. Then, if ui
has been successfully verified, Ruij is published to C so that
each user can see not only the information that Ruij contains,
but the reputation score rui of ui as well. The problem here is
to find a way to achieve the following:
1) Keep the information of each ui private, even if C colludes
with RA (provide unlinkability);
2) Keep each vote on a report hidden by the linking of voters;
3) Add each vote to the reputation of the corresponding user
so that the reputation of each user will be updated;
4) Prevent double voting;
5) Trace back a user who is acting maliciously (provide
accountability);
Threat Model: The protocol that is presented in this paper,
assumes that the adversaries follow the Dolev-Yao threat model
[21]. In Dolev-Yao adversarial model, adversaries can overhear
and intercept any message that is exchanged between two or
more parties in the network. In addition to that, they can keep
history of the exchanged messages and use them later on in an
attempt to learn more than what it is prescribed.
Assumptions: First of all, we assume that any number of
parties on this network may collude to break the anonymity of
other user(s) in the network (unbounded collusion).
Furthermore, we assume that each authority has a certificate.
With this way, attacks such as denial of service can be avoided
since users can authenticate authorities with which they com-
municate.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF LOTS
In this section, we introduce our protocol which satisfies
the above mentioned criteria and offers privacy preserving
mechanisms for the users of a participatory sensing application.
Before we proceed with the actual description of the protocol
we provide a high-level overview of the tasks that users are
able to execute through the participatory application.
A user ui registers to the application and joins a group of
users (groupt) that is created by RA. As we will explain later
on, with the use of group signatures, ui can prove that is a
valid user without revealing her real identity. Every time that
ui wants to publish a new report, she contacts C and proves
that is a member of groupt. C processes the request and if
it is considered as valid it publishes the corresponding report
to the rest of the community so that everyone can see it. The
last task that a user can execute is to vote for the validity of a
report or just for the importance of the published information.
To this end, user sends a voting request to C. C is responsible
for checking that this user has not voted before for this report
and if so, proceeds by adding her vote to the corresponding
report. Otherwise the request is considered as invalid and C
drops the connection. In the following sections these steps are
described in details.
A. Setup Phase
Installation: User ui registers her smart-phone by in-
stalling the participatory sensing software from an application
distributed market (ADM ) such as Android Market or App
Store. The authorization at this step could happen during the
installation process as employed by the Android phones or at
the start of an application as on iPhones. During installation,
a credential credui is issued and stored to user’s device.
The stored credential contains the following attributesPrivate
credentials and how attributes can be encoded into credentials
have become the subject of an extensive research with many
different proposed schemes and suggested approaches. For
more information, we refer the reader to [22], [23].:
• A unique serial number Sui which is encrypted with the
public key of RA
• A timestamp tinit which contains the date and time that
ui installed the application and retrieved Sui
• The username (usrmarket) that ui has registered with
the ADM from which she downloaded the software (e.g
username used for the App Store).
So, the credential that user receives, contains the following
information:
〈ERA (Sui) , ERA (tinit) , EC (ERA (usrmarket))〉,
where the notation Ex(.) refers to the results of the application
of an encryption function with the public key of entity x.
B. User Registration
The first time that ui connects to the service, contacts RA
in order to register as a new user. By revealing some of the
attributes that are contained in credui she needs to prove that
she obtained a valid credential from ADM . This can be done
using the proof of knowledge described in [24].
So, ui reveals to RA the unique serial number ERA (Sui)
that received during the installation phase as well as
ERA (tinit). Upon reception, RA decrypts these values with
skRA and finds Sui and tinit. RA has a table in which stores
all the hashes of the unique serial numbers that receives from
newcomers. Let H(.) be a secure cryptographic hash function
such as SHA3. RA calculates H(Sui)||H(tinit) and checks
via a table lookup if the generated value already exists in
the table. If not, she stores the generated hash to the table.
Otherwise, drops the connection since the request is coming
from an already registered user.
Fig. 1. Registration Phase
Group Signatures: In order for ui to actively participate in
the community she must be able to prove to the authorities that
she is a valid user. In order to do so, she will have to provide
some kind of evidence derived from RA and prove that she
has already registered. To this end, RA sets a time interval
tint for which every new user that requests a registration will
become a member of a group groupt. More precisely, ui by
joining this group will be able to anonymously sign messages
on behalf of that group. Signatures can be verified with respect
to a single group public key, but they do not reveal the identity
of the signer. The joining procedure is implemented by a joint
computation between ui and RA in such a way that the private
key of ui remains secret. Then, RA creates a private group key
on ui and issues a membership credential so that ui may later
submit reports anonymously.
Newcomer Additional Parameters: Apart from the addition
of ui to groupt, RA creates and sends to ui the following
parameters:
• The reputation score rui of ui, encrypted with the public
key pkC of C. At the registration step the reputation score
will have a negative value not only for motivating the user
to participate in the community but also as a metric to
prevent whitewashing attacks1 (also known as newcomer
attacks).
1Whitewashing attacks occur when a user abuse the system by letting
her reputation degrade and then escapes the consequences by using system
vulnerability to repair their reputation. Most common practice is to reenter the
system with a new identity and a fresh reputation [25]. The attack is facilitated
by the availability of cheap pseudonyms [26]. For a detailed description of
whitewashing attacks and defensive mechanisms we refer reader to [27].
• A list (rptsui ) encrypted with the public key of C, that
will hold a list of all the reports that ui will publish. The
initial value will contain a signature σ(vrui) on a random
nonce generated from RA.
• A list (votesui ) encrypted with the public key of C, that
will hold a list of all the reports that ui will vote for. In
the beginning, the value of this list will contain a signature
σ(vrui) on a random nonce generated from RA.
So, at the end of the registration step RA sends back to ui
the following:
〈GroupParams,EC (rui) , EC (rptsui) , EC (votesui)〉.
C. Report Submission
When ui wants to publish a report, she needs to do it
through C. Each time that ui contacts C, uses anonymous
authentication in order to prove that it is a valid user. We
assume that ui wants to publish a report R
ui
j . To achieve this, ui
uses a group signature to sign a nonce challenge that is provided
by C. Then, C validates that the signed message comes from a
registered user and if so, sends back to ui a successful message.
Upon reception, ui sends back to C the following message:
〈
EC
(
Ruij
)
, EC (rui) , EC (rptsui)
〉
C decrypts EC
(
Ruij
)
with skC , creates a unique serial
number (SRui
j
) for the submitted report and adds the reputation
score of ui to it by decrypting EC (rui). Then, all users that
read Ruij will be able to see the reputation of the user who
posted the corresponding report.
In addition, C has a table Treports where she stores all
the hashes of report lists that she receives from the users.
So, she calculates H (EC (rptsui)) and checks if this value
already exists in Treports. If so, she removes it from Treports,
decrypts EC (rptsui), adds the newly submitted report SRui
j
and calculates H (EC (rptsui)) which is stored in the Treports
table2. Finally, C publishes Ruij along with the reputation rui
and sends back to ui an acknowledgment as well as the updated
list of reports.
User C
Submit Report Request
Generates random nonce r
Signs with group key: σ(r)
Verifies and request the report
EC
(
Ruij
)
, EC (rui) , EC (rptsui)
ACK and the updated EC(rptsui)
Fig. 2. Report Submission
2When a user has not previously published any report, C will not have a
hash mapping in Treports, can recognize the ciphertext of an empty list by
contacting RA.
D. Voting
Lets assume that a user uk wishes to vote for a report R
ui
j .
First, she proves to C that is a registered user and then sends
the following:
〈
EC (votesuk) , EC
(
SRui
j
, vk
)〉
,
where votesui is a list of all the reports that uk has voted for,
SRui
j
is the serial number of the current report that she wants to
vote for and vk is her actual vote. Upon reception, C decrypts
the message and processes the submitted request as follows:
• Case 1 – User has not submitted votes for any other re-
port: In that case, when C opens EC (votesuk) recognizes
that it does not contain a list of reports that the user
has voted for. More precisely, the content should be a
signature from RA. So, C first checks a table Tvotes to
see if EC (votesuk) already exists. If not, validates that
the message is signed by RA. Then, stores the received
signature (σ) in Tvotes, calculates H(σ||SRui
j
) and adds
it to Tvotes. Then, updates user’s voting list by setting
votesuk equal to EC
(
SRui
j
, H
(
SRui
j
||σ
))
, and sends it
back to uk. Furthermore, she updates the votes in the
corresponding report.
• Case 2 – User has submitted vote(s) for other report(s):
When C opens EC (votesuk) will see the following:
– A list votesuk =
{
SRui
1
, . . . , SRui
k
}
where k 6= j, of
serial numbers that corresponds to the reports that uk
has already voted for.
– The hash value:
H ′ = H(SRui
k
||H(SRui
k−1
|| . . . ||H(SRui
1
||σ)))
that is generated every time that she submits a vote
for a published report.
So, C checks if SRui
j
∈ votesuk . If not, C checks if H
′
exists in Tvotes and update votesuk by adding a new serial
number and updating the hash value H(SRui
j
||H ′). Then, she
sends back to uk the list of votes and updates the votes in the
corresponding report.
E. Reputation Update
Since every user can vote for every report and the reputation
of users is not actively connected to the votes of their reports,
we must design a mechanism in which the reputation of users
and the reputation of the corresponding reports will be updated
frequently. In order to achieve that, we assume that there is
a time interval trep in which all users have to contact C in
order to update their reputations. So, each user ui will send
rptsui and rui encrypted with pkC . Upon reception, C decrypts
rptsui with skC and finds a list with all the reports that ui has
published. Then, calculates the hashes and checks its freshness.
If C finds any old rptsui changes the corresponding reputation
to the initial state (negative reputation). For the rest of the lists,
that are considered valid, C finds the current reputation scores
for the corresponding reports, calculates the average, encrypts
it with pkC and updates rui . In addition, C adds a timestamp in
rui that will prove when was the last time that a user updated
her reputation. Then, C sends back to ui the updated reputation.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the behavior of LotS when different types of
attacks take place is analyzed. In all the attacking scenarios, it
is assumed that the authorities RA and C follow the protocol
specifications but they can keep history of the exchanged
messages in an attempt to learn more than what has been
prescribed. Additionally, attackers can collude in order to find
the real identity of the users and, thus, break their privacy.
Breaking the Anonymity of ui: As described in Section IV
the first step for a user before start using the service is to
register through RA. In this phase, ui first contacts RA and
proves that she owns a valid credential and a unique serial
number from ADM . Then, RA adds ui to a group (groupt)
of users that share the same group signature key. Now, every
time that ui wishes to publish a new report or vote for a
published report she signs a message on behalf of that group.
As a consequence, the authorities will be able to know only the
group in which ui belongs to, but none of them will be able
to find the exact user that published the report3. The only case
where an authority can extract the real identity of a user is in
the extreme case where at the time that ui tries to publish a new
report or tries vote for a published report, is the only member of
groupt. But still, if this extreme case is considered, RA needs
to collude with ADM in order to find the real identity of ui
through the unique serial number Sui that ADM assigned to
ui and is also known to RA from the registration phase. This
problem can be easily solved; if instead of ADM storing {Sui}
at a user’s device, she will blindly sign a random number that
will be sent from ui. Then ui will have to prove to RA that she
owns a valid signature from ADM . So, even if RA colludes
with ADM it will not achieve to reveal the real identity of the
user.
Double Voting: Assume that a user ui votes for a report
SRuj . The serial number of the report is added to user’s voting
list votesui . Suppose that ui tries to vote again for the same
report. In the simple case where ui contacts C with the latest
list votesui , C will immediately realize that SRuj already exists
in votesui so it will drop the connection. In order for ui to
avoid this detection, she can send to C a list votes′ui that
does not contain SRuj (i.e a list that was received in the past).
Then, C will check for the hash value H(.) that is contained
in votes′ui and she will notice that the received value does not
exist in the table Tvotes. So, C will realize that ui has sent a
non-valid list and will not process the request.
Using the Reputation of Another User: Suppose that a
user uj wishes to publish a report but instead of using her
reputation, tries to use the reputation of another user ui. In
order to achieve it, uj must gain access to rptsui . Since all
the communication between the users and the authorities is
encrypted the only method for uj to get rptsui is either to
directly cooperate with ui or to collude with C. For the first
case, it is clear that the consent of the user ui is needed. The
privacy of ui can be breached with her own consent. In addition
to that, ui will need to receive from uj the updated rptsui that
it was generated and sent to uj after publishing the new report.
Otherwise, ui will not be able to publish a new report again.
3The security of group signatures under the random oracle model is based
on the intractability of discrete logarithm.
Hence, if ui does not update rptsui her account will be almost
disabled since she will only be able to vote for a published
report while her publish rights will be disabled. Regarding the
second case, uj will need to receive rptsui from C, which have
stored the history of the exchanged messages. This implies that
the authorities deviate from the protocol flaw which contradicts
our hypothesis.
Accountability (traceability): Anonymity and accountabil-
ity are supposedly opposing factions in a zero-sum game be-
tween privacy and security. Generally speaking, we can say that
an action is accountable if it can be attributed to a certain entity.
Even though anonymous communication provides enormous
public benefits, it has been reportedly used to aid people
to perform illegal transactions. Accountability mechanisms,
allows to reveal the identity of a user who acts maliciously. As
described in [20], in case of a user’s misbehavior, the signature
can be “opened” (with or without the help of of the group
members), in order to reveal the identity of the signer. In our
protocol, we assume that each group consists from at least k
users; this will ensure the k-anonymity of the signing users
[28]. By doing this, we ensure that not only RA will be able to
reveal the anonymity of a user; thus, providing a better privacy
since if we assume that RA is compromised it will need the
cooperation of other members of a group in order to reveal the
identity of a user.
Disadvantages: Even though we have managed to provide
reliable anonymity in the sense that each user keeps her
real identity hidden during her transactions in the community,
protecting the privacy of a user is a more complex subject. More
precisely, LotS fails to prevent the profiling of a user. Recall
that every time that a user wishes to publish a new report or
wants to give a vote, she needs to interact with C and reveal a
list with all the reports that she has published or she has voted
for. So, in case C is acting maliciously, can collect data and
create user profiles.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented LotS. A privacy preserving
reputation system for participatory sensing applications. LotS
manages to provide accountable anonymity. Users are able to
exchange information in a lawful manner without being tracked.
On the other hand, users who are misbehaving will loose their
anonymity and they will encounter the repercussions that are
defined from the community regarding malicious behaviors.
Additionally, users have a reputation score for which they
cannot lie about or shed while at the same time the reputation
is updated and demonstrated in such way that does not com-
promise anonymity. In particular, LotS maintains unlinkability
between the identity of users and the reports they publish.
Moreover, on our theoretical analysis we prove the resistance
of the protocol under different kinds of attacks. As a next step
we are planning to further improve our protocol by providing
mechanisms that will avoid the profiling of a user. Finally, we
intend to implement our protocol in actual smart-phone devices
with different computational resources.
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